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 SETTLEMENT OUT OF COURT:
 THE DISPOSITION OF MEDICAL
 MALPRACTICE CLAIMS
 PATRICIA MUNCH DANZON and LEE A. LILLARD*
 I. INTRODUCTION
 THE main purpose of this paper is to present empirical estimates of a
 model of the disposition of claims through the courts. Landes, Gould,
 Posner, and others have developed a theoretical model of the disposition
 process, in which the decision to settle and the size of settlement depend
 on the defendant's maximum offer (expected award at verdict plus litiga-
 tion costs) relative to the plaintiff's minimum ask (expected award at
 verdict minus litigation costs).' Variants of this model have been applied
 in several contexts, but so far it has not been tested empirically with data
 on individual claims.2 The obstacles to estimation by standard economet-
 ric techniques are twofold. First, the hypothesized determinants of the
 outcome-the potential verdict, ask, offer, and litigation costs-are all
 unobserved in the data available. Second, if the theory is correct, claims
 closed at each stage of disposition are not random samples but are "self-
 selected" on the basis of those case characteristics whose effect we wish
 to measure. Therefore, analysis of the observed outcome-size and pro-
 bability of payment to the plaintiff, at verdict and in out-of-court settle-
 ment-cannot be generalized to the universe of claims as a whole. Param-
 * Senior Research Fellow, the Hoover Institution, and Senior Economist, Rand Corpora-
 tion and University of Southern California.
 1 William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J. Law & Econ. 61 (1971);
 John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. Legal Stud. 279 (1973); Richard A.
 Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. Legal
 Stud. 399 (1973).
 2 Landes, supra note 1, uses statewide data on criminal cases to analyze trial frequency.
 Patricia Munch, An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain, 84 J. Pol. Econ. 473 (1976),
 estimates determinants of size of payment in eminent domain cases. William Baxter, The
 Political Economy of Anti Trust (Robert D. Tollison ed. 1980), discusses settlement of
 antitrust cases.
 [Journal of Legal Studies, vol. XII (June 1983)]
 ? by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0047-2530/83/1202-0007$01.50
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 eter estimates are valid conditional estimates for claims closed at each
 stage of disposition but are potentially biased estimates of population
 parameters. In particular, we cannot use information from claims actually
 closed at verdict to infer the potential verdict for claims actually settled.
 In this study of the disposition of medical malpractice claims we de-
 velop maximum likelihood estimation procedures that, together with
 some simplifying theoretical and empirical assumptions, enable us to ob-
 tain unbiased estimates of population parameters and of the unobserved,
 latent variables-potential award at verdict, potential settlement, ask,
 and offer-for all claims, regardless of their stage of disposition. The
 model is estimated with data from two surveys of insurance company
 claim files closed in 1974 and 1976. Among the more interesting findings,
 we estimate that, on average, cases settle for 74 percent of their potential
 verdict and that settlement size is much closer to the maximum the defen-
 dant would be willing to offer than to the minimum the plaintiff would
 settle for. Since the estimates are constrained by the assumptions of the
 model, we cannot test the model directly. However, the plausibility of the
 estimates supports the plausibility of the model.
 A second purpose of the paper is to provide evidence relevant to the
 policy debate over tort reform. The early 1970s witnessed a rapid increase
 in the frequency and size of claims in many lines of tort law: personal,
 product, professional, municipal, and automobile liability. The subse-
 quent increases in liability insurance premiums led many states to enact
 changes in liability law, especially for medical malpractice and product
 liability. These tort "reforms" were intended to reduce the size of
 awards, limit the scope of liability, and reduce the cost of litigation.3 More
 fundamental changes, such as replacing the negligence with a no-fault
 system for malpractice, were shelved pending the outcome of these tort
 reforms.4
 Major criticisms of the system are that awards are either random or
 excessive; that the legal standard of negligence has little bearing on the
 outcome of the great majority of cases that settle out of court; that the
 costs of operating the system are exorbitant; and that these costs bar valid
 but small claims for recovery and induce "nuisance" claims on which
 insurance companies can be forced to pay, no matter how specious, in
 3 These measures include caps on awards, periodic payments of future damages,
 modification of the collateral source rule, limits on contingent fees, use of arbitration and
 pretrial screening panels, shorter statutes of limitations, etc. A listing of the changes, by
 state, is given in Patricia Munch Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Malpractice
 Claims (Rand Corp. R-2870-HCFA/ICJ, 1982).
 4 For example, Clarke C. Havighurst, "Medical Adversity Insurance"--Has Its Time
 Come? 1975 Duke Law J. 1233.
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 order to avoid more costly litigation. These allegations are apparently lent
 some credibility by the observed outcome of the disposition process. For
 example, of medical malpractice claims closed in 1974 and 1976, less than
 10 percent were tried to verdict; the remainder were settled out of court.
 In cases tried to verdict the plaintiff won 28 percent of the time, whereas
 the plaintiff received some payment in 51 percent of cases settled out of
 court. The average award at verdict was $102,000, compared to $26,000 at
 settlement. Roughly 50 percent of the total dollar payout was concen-
 trated on less than 3 percent of all claims.
 Our estimates show that the most extreme criticisms are unfounded.
 Legal standards appear to influence court verdicts directly and settle-
 ments indirectly. Lower plaintiff win rates and larger awards at verdict
 than at settlement are largely attributable to nonrandom selection of
 cases, by stage of disposition. However, outcomes do systematically de-
 part from the legal standard in ways predicted by the economic model of
 claim disposition. Tort reforms designed to limit awards and limit contin-
 gent fees have had significant effects.
 The model is also used to simulate the effects of hypothetical changes in
 the cost of litigating, such as might result from the introduction of arbitra-
 tion or pretrial screening panels. We estimate that, under plausible as-
 sumptions, a 30 percent reduction per case in both plaintiff and defense
 costs of going to verdict would reduce total litigation costs by only 3
 percent, because the percentage of cases going to verdict increases and
 the percentage dropped without payment decreases.
 The structure of the paper is as follows. The theoretical model is de-
 scribed in Section II. Section III discusses estimation and describes the
 data. Section IV reports empirical results, including goodness of fit of the
 model and parameter estimates. Section V provides estimates of the pro-
 bability of winning at verdict for cases settled out of court. Section VI
 analyzes the discrepancy between mean award at verdict and settlement
 and the extremely skewed distribution of dollar payout. Section VII dis-
 cusses the effects of actual and hypothetical tort reforms and simulates
 their ramifications on the entire disposition process. Section VIII contains
 concluding remarks.
 II. THE MODEL
 Under the law of medical malpractice, a medical practitioner is liable
 for damages if a patient suffers an injury linked causally to medical treat-
 ment that fell short of the "due" standard of care.5 In our sample, 43
 5 Under the strict locality rule, due care is the customary practice of physicians in the
 same specialty and locality. Since the 1960s, this strict version has been expanded by many
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 FIGURE 1.- Disposition of medical malpractice claims
 percent of claims are dropped without payment, 51 percent are settled
 with payment out of court, and 7 percent are litigated to verdict with the
 plaintiff winning roughly one in four. This sequential disposition process
 is illustrated in Figure 1. Here we present a very simple variant of the
 underlying behavioral model. It is derived from a more complete model in
 which the litigants select utility-maximizing expenditure on litigation,
 subject to an expected payoff, in terms of influence over the outcome, and
 the cost of litigation inputs.6 Because of the limited data available for this
 empirical study, we do not explicitly model the choice of litigation inputs
 and their influence on outcomes, bluff and gaming, expected yields in
 settlement and the modification of bargaining positions over time, or de-
 lay either as an input or as an outcome.
 Except where otherwise stated, the notation and discussion below refer
 to log values, corresponding to the log transformation of dollar values
 used in estimation.' The following notation will be used:
 V = potential award at verdict (log);
 P = probability the plaintiff wins at verdict;
 W = propensity to hold for the plaintiff at verdict (log);
 courts to include similar localities for general practitioners and a nationwide standard for
 specialists.
 6 Patricia Munch Danzon, The Disposition of Medical Malpractice Claims (Rand Corp. R-
 2622-HCFA 1980).
 7 Since taking logs changes a multiplicative into an additive relationship, the log trans-
 form is appropriate for estimation if laws and other measured binary variables and all
 unmeasured factors included in the residual have proportional effects on awards. With our
 data, major unmeasured factors are litigation costs and the plaintiff's probability of winning,
 both of which plausibly have roughly proportional effects.
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 M = defendant's maximum offer (log);
 A = plaintiff's minimum ask (log);
 S = potential settlement (log);
 X = vector of case and state characteristics;
 g = weight of offer in settlement ("bargaining parameter");
 0, 8~, y gx, 3, are parameters to be estimated; v, w, u, E, are residuals
 reflecting unmeasured characteristics.
 The Courts
 For each claim there is a probability that the plaintiff will win and a
 potential award should the case go to verdict.
 Potential Verdict (V). The potential award at verdict (V), conditional
 on winning, depends on the severity of the injury and the law defining
 compensable damages:
 V = C'X + v, (1)
 where X is a vector of observed case and state characteristics such as
 severity of injury and laws of compensable damage and v is a residual
 reflecting all unobserved factors.
 In general, the basic rules of damages for personal injury apply in
 medical malpractice cases. Compensable damage has two components:
 "economic" loss (wage loss, medical and other out-of-pocket expenses)
 and "pain and suffering," which is a catchall for all nonpecuniary dam-
 ages. Under the collateral source rule, awards are not reduced by com-
 pensation from other sources, such as medical or unemployment insur-
 ance. Typically, the award is paid in a lump sum, which includes damages
 incurred to date (without interest) and the present discounted value of
 expected future damages. Since 1975 many states have enacted statutory
 changes in the basic tort damage rules for cases of medical malpractice.
 These changes include dollar caps on either the total award or some
 component, admissibility of evidence of compensation from collateral
 sources, periodic rather than lump-sum payment of future compensation,
 and abolition of the plaintiff's ad damnum (the amount named as damages
 in the plaintiff's complaint).
 Plaintiff's Probability of Winning (P). Under the negligence standard,
 the plaintiff must prove that he suffered an injury linked causally to sub-
 standard medical care. The probability of a verdict for the plaintiff (P)
 therefore depends on case and state characteristics (X) such as the quality
 of the evidence and the law defining liability and the burden of proof. As is
 common in modeling discrete outcomes, empirically we work with a
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 monotonic function of P, which we denote W and interpret as a propen-
 sity to hold for the plaintiff:
 W = O'X + w, (2)
 where the residual, w, is assumed to be normally distributed with unit
 variance (r2, = 1). If W exceeds zero, the plaintiff wins. Then P, the
 probability that W takes any positive value, may be represented by the
 cumulative normal function, 4(W):
 P = 1 - #(-0'X) = (0O'X) (3)
 Settlement Out of Court
 Because litigation is costly, both parties have incentives to settle. The
 minimum the plaintiff will settle for, the "minimum ask" (A), depends on
 his expected payoff from litigating to verdict, net of his incremental litiga-
 tion costs:
 A = yW + Y2V - 'X + u(4)
 = (-a' + Y10' + y2Y')X + E1,
 where a'X is the discount factor due to plaintiff litigation costs and ul is a
 residual representing plaintiff prediction errors and other unobserved fac-
 tors. Similarly, the maximum the defendant will offer (M) depends on his
 expected payoff at verdict plus his incremental litigation costs:
 M = Y3W + Y4V + 'X + U2(5)
 = (3' + y~30' + y4')X + E2,
 where 3'X is the markup due to defense litigation costs and the residual u2
 reflects defense prediction errors and other unobserved factors.8 Note
 that the ask and offer defined here are not the ask and offer actually made
 in pretrial negotiations. They are unobserved, latent values that implicitly
 define the potential range of bargaining and hence determine the disposi-
 tion of claims, specifically:
 Drop: If the ask becomes negative the case is dropped with zero
 payment:9
 A < 0 -- case is dropped. (6)
 8 In dollars, the ask is: A = WV2e-a X+ul. The ask and offer are formulated in terms of
 W rather than P for technical reasons. To simplify exposition here, we do not distinguish
 between the true value of W and the litigants' expectations. This is modeled explicitly in
 Patricia Munch Danzon & Lee A. Lillard, The Resolution of Medical Malpractice Claims:
 Modeling and Analysis (Rand Corp. R-2792-ICJ, 1982)
 9 A more plausible assumption would be that a case is dropped if the potential settlement
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 Settle: If the minimum ask is positive but less than the maximum
 offer, settlement occurs:
 0 < A < M -- settlement possible. (7)
 Litigate: If the ask is positive and exceeds the offer, the case is tried
 to verdict:
 0 < A and M < A -- litigate to verdict. (8)
 Settlement Size: The potential settlement (S) is a weighted average of
 the ask and offer:'
 S = gM + (1 - g)A (9)
 where g, the parameter that gives the weight attached to the offer, may be
 interpreted as a measure of the plaintiff's relative bargaining strength.
 A major difference between this and similar models is the addition of
 the condition for a case to be dropped (eq. (6)). Most models posit an offer
 equal to the defendant's expected payoff plus litigation costs. Hence if
 litigation costs are always positive, the offer is always positive. This
 assumption cannot explain why many cases (43 percent in our sample) are
 closed with zero payment." We adopt the simple hypothesis that cases
 are dropped if the (log) ask becomes nonpositive.
 Predictions of the Model
 This model implies that the disposition of all claims, including those
 settled out of court, is influenced by the legal standard of payment equal
 is negative. This model could not be estimated with the data available. The two models are
 equivalent if in practice the defense does not make a positive settlement offer if the plain-
 tiff's expected net payoff is negative. Equation (6), which is in log dollars, implies that a case
 is dropped if the ask in dollars is less than $1.00. Assuming proportional costs, the ask in
 dollars cannot be negative as long as the expected payoff is positive.
 1o In dollars, the settlement is a weighted geometric mean, S = MA'( -g)
 " In discussing "nuisance" suits, Posner, supra note 1, at 433 & n.46, abandons the
 formal model and hints at notions of bluff, strategic behavior, and plaintiff error. He con-
 cludes: "One is led to predict . . . that pure nuisance claims are infrequent, that when made
 they are usually turned down, and that when turned down the plaintiff does not pursue the
 matter in court. This is not to say that there are never fraudulent claims having a sufficiently
 large expected value to support a credible threat to litigate if the defendant refuses to settle
 ? . . or claims that, while unlikely to prevail, are not so weak that they would not justify a nongaming claimant in expending some money on a lawsuit." This suggests, without explic-
 itly predicting, that cases closed with zero payment (1) are infrequent and (2) typically have
 a low probability of winning and (3) large stakes. The evidence is consistent only with the
 second of these predictions.
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 to damages if and only if negligence occurred. However, certain system-
 atic departures from this standard are also predicted. Specifically:
 1. Settlements discount the potential verdict by the probability of a
 plaintiff verdict.
 2. The discrepancy between settlement and potential verdict is larger
 (smaller) the larger are plaintiff's (defendant's) litigation costs. This is
 because the plaintiff will settle for less, and the defendant will offer more,
 the higher their respective costs of going to verdict.
 3. The probability that a claim is dropped without payment to the plain-
 tiff depends not only on the probability of proving liability in court but
 also on the size of the potential award (negatively) and plaintiff's litigation
 costs (positively).
 4. Cases closed at each stage of disposition are not a random sample of
 all claims but are "selected" on the basis of case characteristics, which
 determine the expected payoff and prediction errors relative to the cost of
 litigation. Specifically, the sample of cases going to verdict will be a small
 atypical group in which the plaintiff's overestimate or the defendant's
 underestimate of the payoff at verdict is large relative to the costs of
 litigation.
 If both parties are risk-neutral wealth maximizers with unbiased expec-
 tations (Y1 = Y2 = Y13 = Y4 = 1), the general model reduces to the
 following special case (in dollars):
 A = PVe -?'(X)+"', (10)
 M = PVeP1'(x)+, (11)
 and
 S = PVegP'(x)-( -g)a'(X)+gui +(l-g)u2 (12)
 This model yields the following additional predictions:
 5. If expectations are unbiased on average, E(u1) = E(u2) = 0, and
 bargaining power and costs are equal, g = .5 and a = 13, then settlement
 is for the expected court award: in dollar terms, S = PV.
 6. A necessary condition for going to verdict is
 u1 - U2 > (X'(X) + P'(X) --> litigate to verdict. (13)
 Thus, if prediction errors are proportional to V, whereas costs are less
 than proportional, then cases involving large stakes are more likely to be
 litigated.'2 Similarly, if prediction errors fall relative to costs as P in-
 12 Posner, supra note 1, shows that the probability of litigation increases with the stakes,
 under the restrictive assumptions that (1) the parties disagree only on the probability of
 winning and (2) the costs of litigation are fixed and do not affect the outcome. Danzon, supra
 note 6, shows that eq. (13) holds even allowing that costs are endogenous and influence the
 outcome.
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 creases, claims where the plaintiff's case is strong are less likely to be
 litigated.
 III. METHODOLOGY AND DATA
 Estimation
 A detailed account of the identification and estimation of the model
 is given in an earlier paper.13 The assumptions outlined above relate
 the observed disposition to the unobserved ask and offer and hence to the
 unobserved potential outcome at verdict. First, the determinants of the
 stage of disposition-drop, settle, or go to verdict-are estimated.14 In-
 formation from these estimates is then incorporated into estimation of the
 parameters of the V and S equations, to control for the fact that cases
 observed to have positive awards at verdict or settlement are not random
 samples of all claims. These techniques are an extension of those used in
 simple selection models.15 Although we do not observe the ask, the offer,
 the potential verdict for cases settled or dropped, and the potential settle-
 ment for cases litigated or dropped, we obtain unconditional estimates of
 the structural parameters of the V, W, A, and M equations and the settle-
 ment parameter, g. Hence we obtain predicted values of these latent
 variables for all cases, regardless of their actual disposition.
 This payoff is obtained at a price. In addition to the behavioral assump-
 tions and the assumption that all residuals are lognormally distributed,
 certain zero coefficient restrictions in some equations are necessary for
 identification. The economic rationale for these coefficient restrictions is
 discussed below in the context of the estimates. While the identifying
 assumptions are restrictive, they seem plausible.
 More troublesome is that we are forced by computational cost and lack
 of data on the evidence of negligence to assume that the plaintiff's pro-
 pensity to win, W, does not affect the ask and the offer. Effectively this
 implies that the estimates of W are conditional, based on cases going to
 verdict only, and may be biased estimates of population parameters.
 Coefficients of variables in all other equations are unbiased, provided that
 they are uncorrelated with W.
 Danzon reports estimates of the determinants of the plaintiff s probabil-
 ity of winning and size of award, at each stage of disposition (presuit, after
 filing suit but before verdict, and at verdict), using logit and ordinary least
 squares (OLS) estimators.16 Those estimates do not control for selection
 13 See note 8 supra.
 14 Assuming log normality of the residuals, a sequential probit model may be used.
 15 For example, James J. Heckman, Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error, 47
 Econometrica 153 (1979).
 16 Danzon, supra note 6.
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 bias so must be interpreted as conditional on the stage of disposition.
 Where relevant, the results from that analysis are reported here.
 Data
 The data are drawn from two surveys of insurance company claims,
 one of files closed in 1974 and the other of files closed in 1976. These
 surveys are broadly representative but not strictly randomized samples of
 claims against physicians and hospitals.'7 Both report information on the
 injury (a severity index, the insurance company's estimate of economic
 loss), the plaintiff (age, sex, income, employment status), the defen-
 dant(s) (physician or hospital), and the outcome of the claim (stage of
 disposition and amount of payment, if any).'8 Claims against multiple
 defendants arising from the same injury have been combined so a "claim"
 refers to a plaintiff's claim against one or more defendants.
 Information on the evidence of negligence is unfortunately sparse and
 not uniform between the two surveys. The 1974 survey reports specific
 allegations by the plaintiff-res ipsa loquitur, misdiagnosis, lack of in-
 formed consent."9 The 1976 survey reports extensive information on the
 nature of the injury. We define broad categories of injuries that are likely
 to influence the ease of proving negligence: (1) an obvious error, such as
 treatment of the wrong part of the body; (2) an injury induced by treat-
 ment; and (3) lack of preventive care. Type 1 cases are categorized with
 1974 res ipsa cases. Binary variables indicate if any one of these (not
 mutually exclusive) injury categories was mentioned at least once in the
 files relating to the incident.
 The litigants' expected costs of going to court are also not reported and
 must be represented by proxy variables, which are discussed below.
 17 The 1974 survey instrument and data are described in American Insurance Association,
 Special Malpractice Review: 1974 Closed Claims Survey (1976). The 1976 survey instrument
 and data are described in Westat Inc., Medical Malpractice Closed Claim Study 1976 (1979).
 18 Response rates tend to be low on items not routinely collected by insurers, such as
 plaintiff's income. Income was dropped from the analysis after preliminary estimates
 showed no significant effects. Incidents were excluded from the analysis if data for key
 variables were missing or inconsistent. Claims involving severe injuries or payment to the
 plaintiff are more likely to have good data and hence are overrepresented in the analysis
 samples.
 19 In the case of an injury that would not normally occur in the absence of negligence, the
 plaintiff may invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur--"the thing speaks for itself." This
 alleges prima facie evidence of negligence and shifts the burden of proof from the plaintiff to
 the defendant. It has also been invoked in situations where the plaintiff was not in a position
 to recognize that or by whom he was being injured because, for example, he was under
 anesthesia. Only 4 percent of cases in the 1976 sample involve obvious error, whereas 20
 percent of cases in the 1974 sample allege res ipsa.
This content downloaded from 130.91.116.52 on Mon, 06 Jun 2016 16:35:33 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 SETTLEMENT OUT OF COURT 355
 Data from other sources on characteristics of the legal environment of
 the state in which a claim occurred were merged with the basic claim files.
 The Appendix Table gives definitions, sources, and means by stage of
 disposition for all variables.
 IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
 Goodness of Fit
 Table 1 reports full information maximum likelihood estimates of the
 structural equations. Before discussing parameter estimates, we briefly
 consider the explanatory power of observed variables and goodness of fit
 of the model. Goodness of fit in this context has a slightly unusual mean-
 ing because the variables to be explained-the potential award (V) and
 propensity to win (W) at verdict, the minimum ask (A), maximum offer
 (M), and potential settlement (S)-are not directly observed for some or
 all claims. The methodology yields two estimates of each variable for
 each claim, one based on observed characteristics (X) only, and the sec-
 ond incorporating the residual (unmeasured characteristics) implied by
 the stage of disposition, given the behavioral and distributional assump-
 tions. For example, if two claims have identical observed (X) characteris-
 tics but one is dropped while the other settles, the model will impute to
 the former a more negative residual in the ask, because of the assumption
 that cases are dropped because the ask is negative. The variance of the
 predicted values, based on observed characteristics only, is the "ex-
 plained variance." The "total variance" is the sum of the variance of the
 predicted values based on observed characteristics plus the variance of
 the residual (unmeasured characteristics). The ratio of explained to total
 variance we term R2. It measures the percentage of total variance ac-
 counted for by observed characteristics.
 This quasi analysis of variance is reported in Table 2. The explanatory
 power of observed characteristics is fairly high for V (43 percent), S (52
 percent), and M (37 percent). Explanatory power is much lower (16 per-
 cent) in A, because both explained and residual variance are larger. The
 large variance of A relative to M suggests but cannot prove that plaintiffs
 are less predictable than defendants. Contributing to the large variance of
 A is the role it plays in the behavioral model, together with the empirical
 facts. Recall that 43 percent of claims are dropped. For these claims, by
 assumption, the ask is negative. Seven percent of claims are litigated to
 verdict. For these claims, by assumption, the ask exceeds the offer. Con-
 sequently the assumptions which constrain the estimates force the pre-
This content downloaded from 130.91.116.52 on Mon, 06 Jun 2016 16:35:33 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 TABLE 1
 PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF STRUCTURAL MODEL
 EQUATION
 Settle-
 Verdict (V) Win (W) Ask (A)* Offer (M)* ment (S)
 gp3 +
 VARIABLE Itl a Itl Itl (1 - g)a
 CONSTANT 4.603 10.3 - .995 6.3 -7.28 7.4 3.93 20.4 2.45
 CALIFORNIA - .204 1.3 . 187 .9
 PERMANENT PARTIAL
 DISABILITY (PPD) .465 3.2 .345 1.9 .. ... ... PERMANENT TOTAL
 DISABILITY (PTD) .604 2.5 .325 1.0 .... ... DE TH .682 3.8 .644 3.0 ... ...
 DEFENDANTS (log) ... ... .448 3.2 ... ... ".44 7.8 .38
 INDUCED BY TREATMENT ... ... .357 1.4 ... ... ...
 LACK OF PREVENTION ... ... -.096 .2 . . . .... ... ... RESIPSA . . . . . - .048 .2 .. .........
 LOSS (log) .441 8.7 ..... ... ....... . . DLOSS (<$100) 2.048 7.1 ... ... ... .......
 H
 0\
 O :Z
 0 O
 >
 tl
 H
 tll
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 LIFE - .006 2.5 . . . . . . . . . . . .
 PPD x LIFE .019 4.3 ..... ... ... ...
 PTD x LIFE .029 4.3 ... ... ... .........
 DEATH x LIFE .013 2.8
 1976 .623 2.3 - .640 2.5 -"1.66 3.9 .08 5.0 -.15
 LID .010 .1 . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . .. .
 LID x 76 -.355 3.7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 COLLATERAL SOURCE
 (COLR) .397 2.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 COLR x 76 -.165 .9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 ATTORNEY ... ... ... ... 1.90 6.6 ... ... .25
 FEE LIMIT ... ... ... ... .71 2.7 ... . . .09
 FEELIM x 76 ... ... ... ... -.69 1.9 ... ... -.09
 LAG IN REPORTING ... .. ... . . .03 .5 . . . . . .004
 CO UR T DELAY ... ... ... ... -.15 2.0 - .15t 2.0 - .15t
 CLAIM FREQUENCY ... ... ... ... -.06 1.7 -.06t 1.7 - .06t
 PRESUIT ... ... ... ... - 1.20 17.8 - 1.20t 17.8 - 1.20t
 PHYSICIAN ... ... ... ... ... ... .35 5.4 .30
 POTENTIAL VERDICT (V) .. ... ... ... 1.14 9.4 .70 6.5 .77
 R2 .43 .17 .16 .37 . 2
 * t-statistics are calculated from the normalized coefficient estimates, a/dcr and (P - a)/or2 -1.t Coeff cients constrain to be equal in A an M.
 cm
 t0-
 to
 O
 O
 O
 C:
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 TABLE 2
 EXPLANATORY POWER OF OBSERVED CHARACTERISTICS (X)
 Source V S A M W
 X 1.56 2.04 4.05 1.83 .21
 Residual 2.08 1.85 20.83 3.12 1.00
 R2 .43 .52 .16 .37 .17
 Total 3.64 3.89 24.88 4.95 1.21
 NOTE.-R2 is the ratio of the variance due to observed characteristics (X) relative to the total variance.
 dicted values of A to exhibit large variance and a low mean.20 Explanatory
 power of observed characteristics is also low in the W equation (17 per-
 cent), partly due to lack of relevant data and because W is estimated from
 the small subsample of cases actually going to verdict. Therefore low
 explanatory power in W relative to V suggests but cannot prove that
 courts are less predictable on the issue of liability than damages.
 Parameter Estimates
 1. Potential Award at Verdict (V) (Table 1, Col. 1). The evidence is
 strong that courts are influenced by the basic law of compensable dam-
 ages and recent modifications.
 Compensable damages. The law of compensable damages provides
 for compensation of economic loss and pain and suffering. We have data
 only on the insurer's estimate of economic loss. If courts awarded a
 uniform markup over economic loss for pain and suffering, the elasticity
 of V with respect to loss would be unity. In fact, the estimated elasticity of
 V with respect to loss is .44. In other words, if economic loss increases by
 $1,000, the potential verdict increases by only $440. In principle the dif-
 ference between the total award and economic loss should measure com-
 pensation for pain and suffering. If so, the estimate that awards do not
 increase in proportion to economic loss might seem to imply that cases
 with relatively large economic loss receive proportionately less for pain
 and suffering. In fact, no such inference should be drawn because the
 20 These perhaps implausible results for A may cast doubt on the assumption that a
 negative ask is a necessary and sufficient condition for a case to be dropped. Alternatively,
 the assumption of log normality may be incorrect. The importance of distributional assump-
 tions in the context of estimating unreported census incomes is shown in Lee A. Lillard,
 James P. Smith, & Finis R. Welch, What Do We Really Know about Wages? The Impor-
 tance of Non-Reporting and Census Imputation (1981).
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 TABLE 3
 EFFECT OF SEVERITY OF INJURY
 TYPE OF DISABILITY
 Permanent Permanent
 Temporary Partial Total Death
 Probability of dropping, A < 0 .500 .317 .248 .317
 Probability of settling, 0 < A < M .451 .617 .677 .619
 Settlement, S(X), log $ 7.13 8.75 9.53 8.85
 Probability of going to verdict,
 A > M .049 .066 .075 .064
 Probability of win, W > 0 .143 .261 .285 .368
 Award, V(X), log $ 7.53 9.13 10.03 9.23
 estimate is biased toward zero by measurement error in loss.21 Similarly,
 the common conclusion that the tort system tends to overcompensate
 small cases and undercompensate large cases cannot be supported or
 refuted with the data available.22
 Table 3 shows how severity of injury affects the outcome. The potential
 verdict for cases of permanent total disability is more than twice as large
 as for cases of death. This is consistent with the law of compensable
 damages, which provides no compensation for a decedent's pain and
 suffering, or medical and living expenses had he lived. Table 3 clearly
 shows that potential verdict affects size of settlement and stage of disposi-
 tion. We return to this later.
 For permanent injuries, awards are greatest for very young plaintiffs,
 increasing roughly 2 percent for each year of life expectancy. For tempo-
 rary injuries awards peak in the late thirties or early forties, suggesting
 that these awards are influenced primarily by current wage loss.23
 21 The error in loss is of two types: (1) missing or erroneous data, which are imperfectly
 controlled for by including the dummy variable, DLOSS, for cases reporting a loss less than
 $100; (2) the loss reported in insurance company files is usually not discounted, and there-
 fore overestimates the present discounted value used by the courts. Using bivariate regres-
 sions, Danzon, supra note 6, shows that the apparent regressivity (elasticity < 1) may be due
 solely to error in reported loss.
 22 For example, American Insurance Association (AIA), supra note 17.
 23 These estimates are from Danzon, supra note 6, using a quadratic function of life
 expectancy. The interactions between the severity indicators and life expectancy were
 introduced to control for potential discounting bias. If reported loss is undiscounted but
 awards reflect a discounted present value, the coefficient of the undiscounted loss variable
 would be downward biased. The coefficients of the interaction variables should be negative,
 and their introduction should raise the coefficient of loss. In fact, the interaction coefficients
 are positive and the coefficient of loss is essentially unaffected. We interpret this as further
 evidence of reporting error in loss, due to factors other than discounting.
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 Tort reforms. Our estimates of the impact of tort reforms are tentative
 for several reasons. Although we include only laws enacted before the
 earliest closure date of claims in our sample, some of these claims may
 have been exempt if filed prior to the effective date of the changes. This
 would bias the estimated effects downward. On the other hand, we cannot
 control for all changes in law and possibly in jury attitudes following the
 1974-75 malpractice "crisis." To the extent that the laws we measure
 pick up the effects of these unmeasured factors, the estimated effects are
 upward biased.
 We include two indicators of tort reforms: modification of the collateral
 source rule to admit evidence of collateral compensation; and a com-
 pound variable, LID, which indicates passage of a law to limit awards,
 institute periodic payments, or limit the plaintiff's ad damnum.24 In order
 to distinguish the net impact of these statutes from the fact that they were
 more likely to be enacted in states where awards were relatively high in
 1974, we include an indicator (0 or 1) for states in which a law was ever
 passed (for example, LID) and an interaction between the indicator and
 the 1976 indicator (LID*76). The coefficient of a law variable alone indi-
 cates the difference in 1974 between states that did and states that did not
 subsequently pass the law. The sum of this coefficient plus the coefficient
 of the interaction measures this differential in 1976. Thus the coefficient of
 the interaction measures the net effect of changing the law.
 Taken at face value, the estimates imply that in states that subsequently
 modified the collateral source rule awards were 49 percent higher in 1974,
 confirming that tort reform was a response to the crisis.25 Modification of
 the collateral source rule reduced this differential by 15 percent by 1976
 but the significance level is low. Measures to reduce awards by limiting
 the plaintiff's ad damnum, limiting the award, or instituting periodic pay-
 ments (LID) are estimated to have reduced awards by 30 percent on
 average.26 Conventional wisdom and other empirical evidence suggest
 24 The LID variable measures the average effect of the three laws. By July 1976, six states
 limited recoveries, five allowed periodic payments, and sixteen limited the ad damnum.
 Since the number of states passing a law is the number of degrees of freedom available to
 estimate its effects, it is impossible to estimate accurately the effects of each law separately.
 The indicator for a law permitting periodic payment is included (by interaction) only for
 claims involving permanent injury, since temporary injuries should not be affected.
 25 Since the equations in Table I are estimated in logs, to obtain the percentage effect of
 an indicator (0 or 1) variable on the dependent variable, exponentiate and subtract 1. For
 example, e"397 - 1 = .49.
 26 Periodic payments will reduce awards if the insurer can establish a trust fund yielding a
 higher rate of discount than ajury would have used to discount future payments to a present
 value. Ken Gepfart, Awards in Injury Cases Spread Out, Los Angeles Times, February 5,
 1981, at 1, reports an increase in firms who specialize in establishing structured settlements
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 that, of the three, ceilings on awards have a greater impact than limits on
 the ad damnum or periodic payments.27 The feedback of laws limiting
 awards on the outcome at earlier stages of disposition is discussed later.
 State and year effects. We include a dummy variable for California,
 since California courts are, allegedly, atypically proplaintiff, and one-
 third of the claims in our sample occur in California. We find no California
 effect. However, this simply implies that California is no different from
 the frequency-weighted mean for other states. The few litigious states that
 dominate this mean may be no different from California, although the
 majority of states may differ.
 The estimates imply that, compared to 1974, verdicts were 83 percent
 higher in 1976 in states which passed no laws to constrain awards, 30
 percent higher in states which did pass such laws. Explaining this trend in
 malpractice awards in excess of that predicted by changes in the rate of
 inflation is beyond the scope of this study. These estimates are consistent
 with evidence that tort recoveries for other liability lines outpaced the
 general rate of inflation during the early seventies.28 However we caution
 that our estimates of trends may be affected by the nonreporting of certain
 other variables in one of the two years.29 Bias in the estimate of year
 effects could bias the estimates of effects of tort reforms, which are essen-
 tially year effects in states that changed a law.
 2. Plaintiff's Probability of Winning (W) (Table 1, Col. 2). The esti-
 mates of the determinants of the plaintiff's probability of winning are
 severely limited by lack of data. Because technical difficulties force us to
 estimate W from cases going to verdict only, the estimates are conditional
 estimates for cases actually going to verdict but may be biased estimates
 of population parameters.
 Evidence of negligence. The estimates imply that the plaintiffs prob-
 ability of winning is higher in cases of severe injury, particularly death.
 This does not necessarily imply that courts relax the negligence standard
 and presents statements by attorneys that they are able to settle for less using structured
 settlements than if required to pay a lump sum.
 27 Cross-sectional analysis of the effect of tort reforms on mean frequency and severity of
 claims, by state, shows that of the three laws grouped together here, only ceilings on awards
 have a significant effect. Patricia Munch Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Malprac-
 tice Claims (Hoover Institution Working Paper E-82-23, 1982).
 28 Between 1974 and 1976, the consumer price index increased 15.4 percent and the
 medical care component increased 22.7 percent; the overall rate of inflation fell from 11.0
 percent to 5.8 percent and the yield on three-year bonds fell from 7.9 percent to 5.3 percent.
 Trends in claim frequency and severity are analyzed in Danzon, supra note 27.
 29 Of the variables with data for one year only, attorney representation is the most
 significant. Although it is included only in the ask, because all equations are estimated
 simultaneously, it could affect coefficients in other equations.
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 in favor of no-fault compensation in cases of severe injuries, as is com-
 monly alleged. Obviously, the more severe the injury, the easier it is to
 show damages. Further, evidence from a study of injuries shows that the
 more severe the injury, the more likely it is due to negligence rather than
 within the normal risk of good care.30 The courts may simply be reflecting
 that fact.
 Recall that the 1974 data indicate allegations made by the plaintiff,
 whereas the 1976 data give information on the injury. Although these
 estimates based on pooled 1974 and 1976 data show no significant effect of
 type of injury or allegation, these coefficients are biased toward zero,
 because the nonuniformity of the data effectively introduces measure-
 ment error. Estimates for each year separately show that cases alleging
 res ipsa typically settle and have a 50 percent higher probability of pay-
 ment to the plaintiff.3 Cases involving obvious treatment error show
 similar effects. Cases alleging lack of informed consent or misdiagnosis
 have a 34 percent and 21 percent lower probability, respectively, of win-
 ning at verdict. Cases of injury induced by treatment are more likely to
 win in settlement, suggesting a higher probability of winning in court.
 Thus there is some evidence that the malpractice system tends to penalize
 obvious errors disproportionately.
 Number of defendants. The plaintiff's probability of winning is al-
 most twice as high in cases involving multiple defendants (.30) as in single
 defendant cases (.16).32 These estimates are almost certainly too low,
 because estimation uses only cases tried to verdict, but the relative mag-
 nitude is interesting. It tends to confirm the hypothesis that the incentive
 facing multiple defendants to shift liability to each other effectively aids
 the plaintiff.33
 3. Why Are Cases Dropped? The Plaintiff's Minimum Ask (A) (Table
 1, Col. 3). By assumption, a claim is dropped if the ask becomes nega-
 tive, which depends on the plaintiff's expected litigation costs relative to
 his expected payoff. Although the explanatory power of observed charac-
 30 California Medical Association, Medical Insurance Feasibility Study (1977). This study
 of injuries arising from medical care in twenty-four California hospitals found that the
 percentage attributable to negligence increases from 12 percent from minor, temporary
 injuries to 83 percent for permanent total disability, 43 percent for fatal injury. Comparison
 between these injury data and the data on claims is at most suggestive and strictly valid only
 if claims are representative of injuries, which cannot be determined with the data available.
 31 Danzon, supra note 6.
 32 The estimated elasticity of W with respect to number of defendants is .46.
 33 The effect of multiple defendants is expected to be less under a rule of pro rata contri-
 bution, since the payoff to shifting blame falls to zero for all defendants expecting to be
 found negligent. Danzon, supra note 6, finds no significant difference in awards in states
 adopting comparative negligence, a proxy for contribution in proportion to fault.
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 teristics is low (R2 = .16), most are statistically significant with expected
 signs. The mean predicted probability of being dropped is .49 for cases
 actually dropped, compared to .37 for cases receiving some payment.
 Potential verdict (V). The elasticity of A with respect to V is 1.12, that
 is, a $1,000 increase in the potential verdict results in a $1,120 increase in
 the ask. This suggests substantial fixed costs of going to court, indepen-
 dent of the stakes, such that the net payoff to litigation is proportionately
 less on small cases. Thus cases with small stakes are more likely to be
 dropped. For example, for minor injuries the probability of being dropped
 is .5, compared to .25 for permanent total disability (see Table 3).
 Plaintiff's litigation costs. Since the plaintiff bears the burden of
 proving negligence, delay which results in decay of evidence and reduces
 compensation, due to forgone interest, is costly to the plaintiff. We use
 two measures of delay: the lag in reporting the claim and court conges-
 tion. Court congestion has the expected negative effect, consistent with
 Landes's finding that the settlement rate in criminal cases is positively
 related to court delay.34 Lag in reporting has no significant effect. Cases
 with attorney representation are much less likely to be dropped.35
 Limits on contingent fees. Limits on contingent fees tended to be
 passed in states with a relatively high litigation rate (only 34 percent of
 cases dropped, compared with 45 percent in other states) in 1974. The
 estimates imply that fee ceilings increased the percentage dropped by 5
 percentage points, decreased settlement size by 9 percent, and reduced
 the proportion of cases litigating to verdict by 1.5 percentage points.
 These estimates tend to refute the common argument that contingent fees
 yield above-competitive, windfall returns, that is, earnings that exceed
 potential earnings on the most valuable alternative use of the attorney's
 time. If so, fees could be reduced with no reduction in attorney effort,
 hence no reduction in the plaintiff's probability of winning and gross
 recovery and an increase in recovery net of fee. On the contrary, the
 evidence is more consistent with contingent fees yielding only competi-
 tive returns at the margin.36
 Other variables. Filing and dropping a case represents error by the
 plaintiff. We hypothesized that errors should occur less frequently (higher
 A) in states where the frequency of claims is high, implying a large stock
 34 Landes, supra note 1.
 35 The elasticity of A with respect to court delay is -.15. Of cases closed presuit, attor-
 neys represented 50 percent of those dropped without payment, 63 percent of those settled
 with payment. Virtually all cases proceeding to suit had representation.
 36 A theoretical analysis of contingent fees and the effects of fee constraints is given in
 Patricia Munch Danzon, Contingent Fees for Personal Injury Litigation, Bell J. Econ., in
 press.
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 of information and possibly more specialized litigants. The weak negative
 effect of claim frequency is inconsistent with this prediction. The indi-
 cator that a claim closed prior to suit (PRES UIT) is included to control for
 unmeasured case characteristics. The significant negative coefficient does
 not imply that filing suit per se increases the probability of receiving
 payment.
 4. The Defendant's Maximum Offer (Table 1, Col. 4).
 Potential verdict (V). The elasticity of the offer with respect to V (.71)
 is considerably less than the ask elasticity (1.12). This suggests that the
 defense spends less on litigation, relative to the plaintiff, the higher the
 potential award, which is plausible if plaintiffs invest more in presenting
 evidence on the extent of damages on cases with larger stakes.37
 Defense litigation costs. We hypothesize that defense costs are higher
 in cases with multiple defendants, because of incentives to shift blame,
 and in cases involving physician defendants, because physicians incur
 higher time and embarrassment costs of going to court than do institu-
 tional defendants. The significant elasticity of the offer with respect to
 number of defendants (.44) is consistent with multiple defendants tending
 to raise costs for the defense.38 The offer is 42 percent higher if there is at
 least one physician defendant.
 Court delay and closure prior to suit reduce the offer; claim frequency
 in the state has a weak negative effect.39
 5. Size of Settlement (Table 1, Col. 5). By assumption, settlement is
 a weighted average of the ask and the offer. The estimates imply that the
 offer dominates, with a weight (g) of .87 compared to .13 for the ask.40 In
 other words, the setttlement is closer to the maximum the defense would
 be willing to offer than to the minimum the plaintiff would accept. The
 37 From eqq. (4) and (5), dA/dV = ydW/dV + y2 - dct/dV + dul/dV, and dM/dV = y3dW/dV + y4 + dp/dV + du2/dV. Thus if expectations are unbiased (du1/dV= du2/dV =
 0), W is independent of V (dW/dV = 0), and plaintiffs are typically more risk averse than
 defendants (y2 < y4), then the higher elasticity of A may arise because defense costs fall by
 more than plantiff costs (dp/dV < da/dV < 0) as V increases.
 38 This may be an upward-biased measure of the cost effect, to the extent that the omitted
 probability of winning is positively correlated with numbers of defendants for reasons other
 than cost.
 39 In order to identify the structural equations, court delay, closure presuit, and claim
 frequency are constrained to have equal effects on the ask and offer. This is plausible for any
 variable which affects the stakes equally for both parties (closure presuit) or shifts costs
 from one to the other (court delay). Also, for reasons of identification, the proxies for
 plaintiff and defense litigation costs (court delay, lag in reporting, physician defendant,
 limits on contingent fees) are omitted from the V and W equations. This is plausible if these
 factors affect the cost of going to verdict but not the input of effort to influence outcome,
 conditional on going to verdict.
 40 The estimate of g may be sensitive to behavioral and distributional assumptions which
 constrain the estimates.
This content downloaded from 130.91.116.52 on Mon, 06 Jun 2016 16:35:33 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 SETTLEMENT OUT OF COURT 365
 estimated parameters of the equation (S) are simply these weights applied
 to the estimated parameters of the A and M equations.
 The estimated elasticity of S with respect to V of .77 implies that the
 proportional discrepancy between settlement and potential verdict in-
 creases with the stakes. On average, cases settle for 74 percent of their
 potential verdict. Settlement size is higher in cases with multiple defen-
 dants or a physician defendant (defense litigation costs); lower (elasticity
 = - .15) in states with court congestion (plaintiff litigation costs); and 9
 percent lower subsequent to limiting contingent fees. Our estimates of the
 marginal product of attorney representation (28 percent) are probably a
 lower bound because of measurement error in this variable due to non-
 reporting in 1974.41
 6. Propensity to Go to Verdict. In our sample, 50 percent of cases
 are settled before a legal suit is filed and 40 percent after suit is filed but
 before verdict (including during trial); less than 10 percent are tried to
 verdict. Although cases tried to verdict represent a small fraction of the
 total, they are important because they determine the precedents that
 guide future settlements and because expenditure on litigation is substan-
 tially higher.42
 Recall that, by assumption, necessary and sufficient conditions for liti-
 gation to verdict are that the ask is positive and exceeds the offer. Under
 certain conditions, this implies that the plaintiff's expectation of the pay-
 out in court exceeds the defendant's expectation by more than the sum of
 their litigation costs. The propensity to litigate is expected to be higher the
 greater the variance of prediction errors relative to the costs of going to
 court. Since the propensity to go to verdict depends on the difference
 between the ask and the offer, the coefficients are simply the difference
 between the A and M coefficients.
 Potential verdict (V). The propensity to litigate increases with V (elas-
 ticity = .4). Since it seems unlikely that prediction errors increase more
 than in proportion to V, this evidence suggests that costs increase less
 than in proportion to V. Thus the stage of disposition appears to be
 significantly influenced by substantial fixed costs of going to court.43
 41 Using single year estimates for cases closed presuit, the effect of attorney repre-
 sentation is 150 percent, Danzon, supra note 6.
 42 The plaintiff attorney's contingent fee percentage is typically 40 percent if the case goes
 to trial compared with 33 percent if it is settled pretrial. Stephen Dietz, Bruce C. Baird, &
 Lawrence Berul, The Medical Malpractice Legal System, in Appendix to the Report of the
 Secretary's Commission on Medical Malpractice (DHEW No. [OS]73-89 1973). For the
 defense, NAIC 1980 reports that expenditure on cases tried to verdict averages twice that on
 cases settled. National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 2 Malpractice Claims, no.
 2 (1980).
 43 Since plaintiff's costs are subtracted in A and defense costs are added in M, a less than
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 TABLE 4
 PREDICTED MEAN VALUES BASED ON OBSERVED CHARACTERISTICS (X),
 BY STAGE OF DISPOSITION
 To VERDICT
 DROPPED SETTLED Won Lost
 Probability of dropping, A < 0 .491 .377 .285 .326
 Probability of settling,
 0 < A < M .460 .563 .650 .613
 Settlement:
 S(X), log $* 7.23 8.23 9.22 8.80
 exp [S(X)]t 3.437. 9,473. 18,945. 11,701.
 exp [S(X) + &r2/2]$ 8,678. 23,920. 47,833. 29,545.
 Probability of going to verdict,
 A > M .050 .060 .065 .061
 Probability of verdict and win,
 A > M and W > 0 .010 .014 .021 .014
 Award
 V(X), log $* 7.86 8.49 9.20 8.73
 exp [V(X)]t 5,821. 12,052. 23,046. 14,176.
 exp [V(X) + 62/2]# 16,460. 34,077. 65,163. 40,820.
 Probability of win, W > 0 .184 .224 .317 .230
 * Mean of log dollar values.
 t Mean of exponentiated log dollar values = approximate median.
 $ Mean of exponentiated log dollar values = approximate mean conditional on X. See note 31.
 Table 4 reports predicted mean values of V, S, etc., by stage of disposi-
 tion.44 The mean V for cases actually litigated to verdict and won is
 roughly twice as large as the mean V for cases settled out of court, which
 in turn is roughly twice that for cases dropped. We return to this below.
 Other variables. Evidence of other factors contributing to the propen-
 sity to litigate is sparse.45 Attorney representation is virtually essential to
 filing suit and, a fortiori, to going to verdict. We estimate that limits on
 contingent fees reduce the probability of going to verdict from .061 to
 .046-a trivial absolute change but a substantial percentage change. Al-
 proportional increase in costs with V implies an elasticity of the difference (A - M) with
 respect to V greater than zero, as observed.
 4 In Table 4, predicted means S(X) and V(X) are means of the log values. To provide
 some measure of central tendency in dollar values, estimates of the median and the mean are
 reported, but both are approximations because of selectivity. For the full sample, dollar
 values are log normally distributed. Then exp [V(X)] estimates the median and exp [V(X) +
 &~/2] estimates the mean conditional on X. For specific dispositions, systematic selection on
 the basis of V(X) implies that for the subsample observed at each disposition, V(X) is not
 normally distributed. Then exp [V(X)] and exp [V(X) + &2/2] are not precise measures of
 median and mean for claims closing at that stage of disposition.
 45 Measured characteristics have little explanatory power in the M - A equation (R =
 .03).
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 TABLE 5
 EFFECT OF NUMBER OF DEFENDANTS
 Single Defendant Net Change Multiple Defendants
 Probability of dropping .455 - .103 .352
 Probability of settling .488 .105 .593
 Settlement (log $) 7.41 1.33 8.74
 Probability of going to verdict .056 -.001 .55
 Award (log $) 8.03 .65 8.68
 Probability win .164 .134 .298
 though multiple defendant cases have 90 percent larger V than single
 defendant cases, a higher probability of winning at verdict (.30 vs. .16),
 and a lower probability of being dropped (.35 vs. .46), they are marginally
 less likely to go to verdict (.055 vs. .056). (See Table 5.) Thus, although
 multiple defendants tend to be associated with large V and, presumably,
 with uncertainty as to the liability of individual defendants (both of which
 tend to increase the probability of going to verdict), this is apparently
 offset by higher defense litigation costs and higher P.
 Evidence reported elsewhere suggests that the probability of going to
 verdict is inversely related to p.46 Cases alleging res ipsa rarely go to
 verdict. Cases alleging misdiagnosis or lack of informed consent have a
 relatively higher probability of going to verdict but a low probability of
 winning.47 Where the insurer's evaluation of the merit of the case is
 known, the insurer's evaluation that there was negligence greatly reduces
 the probability of going to verdict.
 V. THE PROBABILITY OF WINNING IN COURT FOR CASES
 SETTLED OR DROPPED
 In theory, the ask, offer, and size of settlement discount the expected
 verdict by the expectation of the plaintiffs probability of winning in
 court, P = +(W). Empirically, we were' unable to incorporate W directly
 into the estimates of A, M, and S to obtain unbiased estimates of P for
 cases settled or dropped. However, P can be estimated indirectly from
 46 Danzon, supra note 6.
 47 This might be construed as investment in establishing more efficient legal rules, assum-
 ing that the existing system provides insufficient deterrence to errors of diagnosis or advice.
 However, the necessary condition for the efficient evolution of common law, that individual
 litigants internalize all social costs and benefits, is surely not realized in medical malpractice.
 See Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient? 6 J. Legal Stud. 51 (1977); George
 L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. Legal Stud. 65
 (1977); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. Legal
 Stud. 235 (1979).
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 TABLE 6
 PLAINTIFF'S PROBABILITY OF WINNING (P) FOR CASES DROPPED AND SETTLED
 INDIRECT ESTIMATES DISPOSITION
 [P = S - V - a(2g - 1)] Dropped Settled
 g = .87
 et = .1 .49 .72
 et = .3 .43 .62
 g=.5
 t = .1 .53 .77
 et = .3 .53 .77
 g = 1.0
 et = .1 .48 .70
 ot = .3 .39 .57
 Direct estimate [P = #(W)]* .18 .22
 * Derived from the estimated W equation. Probably downward biased because of estimation of W from
 cases going to verdict only.
 the settlement equation, given estimates of S, V, the bargaining parameter
 (g), and litigation costs as a percentage of potential award (a and P), and
 assuming unbiased expectations and risk neutrality. By equation (14) in
 dollars:
 S = PVeg9'(x)-(1-g)?a'(x), (14)
 or in logs:
 S = P + V + gp(X) - (1 - g)a'(X). (14')
 We have estimates of S, V, and g from the data, but ae and p are un-
 known. If we further assume that costs are a uniform percentage of poten-
 tial award, the same for plaintiff and defense (that is, &a = P), then we
 have:
 P = S - V - a(2g - 1). (15)
 Equation (15) is used to estimate P under two assumptions about costs:
 (1) costs are 10 percent of V (a = p = .1), and (2) costs are 30 percent of
 V (a = p = .3); and three assumptions about g: (1) the plaintiff domi-
 nates, as estimated (g = .87), (2) bargaining strength is equal (g = .5), and
 (3) settlement is at the offer (g = 1).48
 Table 6 reports estimates of P under these alternative assumptions. The
 bounds on P for cases settled with payment range from .57 (if g = 1, a =
 .3) to .77 (if g = .5, a = .1 or .3), whereas for cases dropped without
 48 We report the estimates based on measured characteristics only, since the results
 including information implied by the stage of disposition are essentially identical.
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 payment estimates range from .39 to .53. Regardless of the assumed pa-
 rameter values, the estimates of P are higher for cases paid than for cases
 dropped. This suggests that the settlement process is not random with
 respect to which cases are paid: cases more likely to win in court are more
 likely to win out of court. Note that these estimates of P are downward
 biased if plaintiff's litigation costs exceed defense litigation costs and if
 plaintiffs are typically more risk averse than defendants.
 Table 6 also gives value of P computed using the estimated coefficients
 of the W equation. These direct estimates are implausibly low (.18 and
 .22). For the wealth-maximizing defendant, it is rational to settle if S < M
 = PVe0 (in dollars). Thus, if P is only .22, it does not pay the defense to
 settle for more than one-third of the potential verdict, even if costs of
 going to verdict are as much as one-third of the potential verdict ( =
 .3).49 In fact, cases that actually settle receive 77 percent of their potential
 verdict. If p = .3, this is rational settlement behavior for the defense only
 if P > .57. If litigation costs are lower ( = .1), the observed settlement
 behavior is rational only if P > .7.
 Thus the discrepancy between plaintiff win rates at verdict (28 percent)
 and settlement (51 percent), often cited as evidence that the settlement
 process is capricious, in fact partly reflects selection bias: cases litigated
 to verdict are disproportionately those where the plaintiff's probability of
 winning is low.
 VI. ACCOUNTING FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF DOLLARS
 The Difference between Mean Verdict and Mean Settlement
 Recall that in our sample the actual mean verdict is $102,000 compared
 with a mean settlement of $26,000. Table 7 presents a rough accounting
 for the discrepancy between mean potential verdict and mean potential
 settlement in terms of two factors: (1) the propensity of claims involving
 large compensable damages to go to verdict, and (2) the fact that out-of-
 court settlements discount potential verdicts for the probability of win-
 ning, litigation costs, etc. As a measure of compensable damages we use
 the mean predicted V for claims closed at each stage of disposition, since
 the main predictors in the V equation are the observed measures of com-
 pensable damages-severity, loss, life expectancy. Subscripts v and s
 denote cases closed (with payment) at verdict and settlement, respec-
 tively.
 The estimates imply that Vv exceeds Vs by 103 percent. By contrast, for
 cases settled out of court, the difference between their potential verdict
 49 From: S/V = PeO = (.22) (1.35) = .30.
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 TABLE 7
 ACCOUNTING FOR DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MEAN VERDICT AND MEAN SETTLEMENT
 Percentage
 Log $ Difference
 V,: mean potential verdict
 (cases won at verdict) 9.20
 V,: mean potential verdict
 (cases paid at settlement) 8.49
 V, - V,: difference due to observed
 measures of compensable damages .71 103
 S,: mean potential settlement 8.23
 V, - S,: difference due to settlement
 process .26 30
 NoTE.-Reported estimates are based on measured characteristics only. Estimates based on measured
 and unmeasured characteristics are very similar. Precise means in dollars are not reported for reasons
 given in note 31 supra.
 and their potential settlement, V, - S,, which reflects discounting for P,
 p - ae, and g, is only 30 percent. Thus the fact that cases going to verdict
 typically involve much larger stakes accounts for over three times as
 much of the explained discrepancy between mean verdict and mean set-
 tlement as the tendency of cases to settle for less than their potential
 verdict.
 Distribution of Total Payment
 A frequent criticism of the tort system in general and medical malprac-
 tice in particular is that the distribution of the total dollar payout is highly
 skewed. The lower 50 percent of cases account for 4 percent of the total
 dollars paid. The upper 5 percent of paid claims (3 percent of all claims)
 account for 49 percent of total dollars paid.
 This uneven distribution may be decomposed into three factors: (1) the
 skewed distribution of compensable damages (59 percent of cases involve
 minor injury, 23 percent involve permanent partial disability, 4 percent
 involve permanent total disability, and 14 percent involve death); (2) the
 fact that cases that settle tend to receive less than their potential verdict;
 and (3) the interaction of V and stage of disposition, that is, cases with
 small V are more likely to be dropped without payment or to settle for less
 than their potential verdict, while cases with large V are likely to go to
 verdict.
 Table 8 shows the contribution of these factors to the skewness of
 dollar payout. Panel A includes all claims closed with and without pay-
 ment. Twenty-six percent actually receive over $6,500, while 2.6 percent
 receive over $140,000. To indicate the contribution of compensable dam-
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 TABLE 8
 ACCOUNTING FOR THE DISPERSION OF DOLLAR PAYOUT
 PERCENTAGE OF CASES
 >$6,500 >$30,000 >$140,000
 A All cases (5,832)
 1. Actual 26.2 9.8 2.6
 2. V 37.9 14.2 3.5
 3. S 32.0 11.0 2.2
 B Paid cases (3,058)
 1. Actual 50 20 5
 2. V 43.5 17.6 4.5
 3. Random V or S 32.1 11.1 2.3
 4. V or S 39.8 14.8 3.3
 C Cases won at verdict (108)
 1. Actual 82.4 55.6 21.3
 2. V 57.8 28.7 9.2
 D Cases paid in settlement (2,950)
 1. Actual 48.8 17.3 4.3
 2. S 39.1 14.3 3.1
 ages, line 2 shows the hypothetical distribution if all cases received their
 potential verdict. The percentage receiving more than $6,500 rises (from
 26 percent to 38 percent), but there is little increase in the over-$140,000
 class (2.6 percent to 3.5 percent). Line 3, which assigns all cases their
 potential settlement, shifts the distribution to the right only marginally
 and still underpredicts in the under-$6,500 size class, because of the large
 percentage closing with zero payment although their potential verdicts
 and settlements are positive.
 Panel B, using paid cases only, tells a similar story. Fifty percent of
 actual payments, compared with 56 percent of potential verdicts, are
 under $6,500. At the other extreme, 5 percent of actual payments, com-
 pared with 4.6 percent of potential verdicts, exceed $140,000. Thus the
 skewed distribution of dollar payout is largely accounted for by the
 skewed distribution of compensable damages.
 The interaction of severity and stage of disposition can be shown in
 several ways. A comparison of potential verdicts (line 2) for all claims
 (panel A) and paid claims (panel B) shows that cases with low V are more
 likely to be dropped: if the propensity to drop were random, the distribu-
 tion of paid claims would mirror the distribution of all claims. Alterna-
 tively, line 3 in Panel B shows the effect of randomly selecting from the
 full sample a subsample equal in size to the paid sample and assigning
 them randomly V or S in the proportions of actual verdicts and settle-
 ments. Line 4 assigns V or S correctly, that is, as a case either went to
 verdict or settled. In all size classes except the lowest, the proportion of
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 TABLE 9
 EFFECTS OF STATE LAWS LIMITING AWARDS:
 DOLLAR CAPS, PERIODIC PAYMENTS, AND ELIMINATING AD DAMNUM
 A. STATES PASSING AT LEAST ONE LAW
 1974 1976 1976 Effect of Law
 (Before) (After) ("If") (2- 3)
 Probability of dropping .371 .484 .435 .049
 Probability of settling .561 .470 .514 - .044
 Settlement, S(X), log dollars 8.03 7.48 7.90 -.42
 Probability of going to verdict .062 .046 .051 -.005
 Award, V(X), log dollars 8.41 7.88 8.42 -.54
 B. STATES NOT PASSING ANY LAWS
 1974 1976 1976 Effect of Law
 (Before) (After) ("If") (3 - 2)
 Probability of dropping .436 .397 .444 .049
 Probability of settling .509 .550 .506 -.044
 Settlement, S(X), log dollars 7.66 8.21 7.79 -.42
 Probability of going to verdict .054 .055 .050 -.005
 Award, V(X), log dollars 8.20 8.53 7.99 -.54
 claims in line 4, using correctly assigned V or S, exceeds what would be
 expected if stage of disposition were random (line 3).
 Panels C (cases won at verdict) and D (cases paid in settlement) com-
 pare the actual and predicted distributions of verdicts and settlements.
 They show that while our predictions of settlements are quite accurate,
 we rather severely underpredict verdicts for the sample of cases actually
 litigated to verdict and won (21.3 percent of actual verdicts exceed
 $140,000, compared to 9.2 percent predicted). This suggests that the dis-
 tribution of verdicts is even more skewed than the lognormal distribution
 we have assumed.
 VII. SIMULATED EFFECTS OF TORT REFORMS
 Limits on Awards
 To illustrate how tort reforms may have indirect and perhaps unfore-
 seen consequences, Table 9 simulates the ramifications of laws designed
 to limit awards (dollars caps, periodic payments and elimination of ad
 damnum). The table distinguishes states that enacted at least one of the
 three laws from states that enacted none. The first two columns show
 mean predicted values in 1974 and 1976, respectively, based on the law
 actually in effect. The third column shows counterfactual calculations,
 that is, predicted values had the law not changed, for states that in fact
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 made a change, and predicted values had the law been changed, for states
 that in fact made no change.
 The counterfactual calculations imply that laws limiting awards re-
 duced potential verdicts by 42 percent.50 This feeds into a 34 percent
 reduction in settlement size, and a 0.5 percentage point decrease in the
 percentage of cases going to verdict. States which passed laws limiting
 awards had higher awards in 1974 than states which passed no such laws.
 This ranking was reversed by 1976, apparently largely due to the change
 in law. As noted above, these are rough estimates of short-run effects.
 They may be downward biased by the exemption of claims filed prior to
 the change, upward biased by other unmeasured legal or attitudinal
 changes coinciding with the tort reforms whose effect we are attempting
 to measure.
 The model can also be used to simulate partial effects of changes in the
 cost of litigating, such as the proplaintiff trends in rules of procedure and
 evidence in the sixties or the introduction of arbitration and pretrial
 screening panels by many states since 1975.51 Predicting precise effects of
 specific measures is beyond the scope of this study.52 Instead we simulate
 the effects of hypothetical cost-reducing measures that result in (1) a 30
 percent reduction in plaintiff costs (increase in A); (2) a 30 percent reduc-
 tion in defense costs (decrease in M); and (3) a simultaneous 30 percent
 reduction in A and M.53 This latter might approximate a uniform switch to
 arbitration. The results are shown in Table 10.
 The 30 percent reduction in plaintiff costs has a minimal effect: 2 per-
 centage point reduction in percentage of cases dropped, 0.6 percentage
 point increase in percentage of cases going to verdict, and a 4 percentage
 point increase in settlement size. The comparable reduction in defense
 costs has the same effect on percentage of cases going to verdict, but
 induces a 26 percent reduction in S because of the dominant weight of the
 offer (g = .87). The simultaneous reduction in plaintiff and defense costs
 increases the percentage going to verdict from 5.6 to 6.9. This small
 absolute increase represents a 23 percent increase. Fewer cases are
 50 From: e-.54 - 1 = -.42. Table 9 shows the effect of passing the average number of
 laws (1.5), whereas Table 1 shows the average effect of each law: (1.5) (-.36) = -.54.
 51 Since the 1960s, common law changes, such as admitting textbooks as evidence of the
 standard of care, expanding the locality rule, and interpreting res ipsa more liberally, have
 effectively reduced the plaintiff's cost of proving liability.
 52 Arbitration and panels may affect the payoff as well as the cost of litigation inputs.
 Alternative forums were not sufficiently widespread by 1976 for us to estimate their effect
 directly from the data.
 53 For (1), we add In 1.3 to the constant in the ask equation. For (2) we subtract In 1.3 from
 the constant in the offer. For (3) we combine (1) and (2). This method of simulating changes
 in costs is obviously only approximate.
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 TABLE 10
 EFFECTS OF HYPOTHETICAL 30 PERCENT REDUCTION IN LITIGATION COSTS
 Plaintiff Defense Both
 Actual Costs Down* Costs Downt Costs Downt
 Probability of dropping .421 .401 .421 .401
 Probability of settling .523 .537 .517 .530
 Settlement, S(X), log dollars 7.85 7.89 7.62 7.66
 Probability of going to verdict .056 .062 .062 .069
 Probability of going to verdict
 and winning .013 .014 .014 .015
 Mean verdict, V(X), log dollars 8.25 8.25 8.25 8.25
 * Plaintiff costs reduced by 30 percent implies ask increases by 30 percent.
 t Defense costs reduced by 30 percent implies offer falls by 30 percent.
 c = a + b.
 dropped, but settlement size for those paid is reduced 22 percent because
 the decrease in the offer more than offsets the increase in the ask.
 These simulations show that measures that reduce costs per case may
 not reduce total expenditure on litigation. To illustrate, assume first that
 the litigation costs of settlement are zero and that the costs of going to
 verdict are 30 percent of the verdict, initially, and 20 percent after the
 change. With these assumptions, total expenditure on litigation falls by 18
 percent, since the increase in percentage of cases going to verdict only
 partially offsets the reduction in cost per case. If costs of settling are 10
 percent of the potential verdict, before and after the change, then total
 litigation costs fall by only 3 percent despite the 30 percent reductions in
 per case costs of going to trial, because fewer cases are dropped and more
 incur settlement and trial costs.
 Obviously, this analysis is insufficient to evaluate the efficiency of pro-
 cedural reform because it ignores the influence of litigation expenditure
 on the outcome at verdict, on incentives to file claims, and ultimately on
 the frequency of injury through deterrence of negligence. It simply illus-
 trates that procedural reform intended to reduce total expenditure on
 litigation may be counterproductive because of the "freeway principle"
 at work: adding more lanes does not simply move the current flow of
 traffic faster, because when the cost per trip falls more traffic enters the
 system.
 VIII. CONCLUSIONS
 Although with the data available one cannot directly test the economic
 model of claim disposition, the plausibility of our estimates, which are
 constrained by the assumptions of the model, lends credibility to the
 model.
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 Taken at face value, the estimates imply that the outcome of the
 malpractice system is far from random. Court awards are strongly related
 to economic loss. Because of error in reported economic loss, we cannot
 measure the markup for pain and suffering, but the conclusion reached by
 others of systematic overcompensation of small cases and undercompen-
 sation of large cases (relative to economic loss) is not sustainable with
 these data. Data deficiencies also limit tests of the extent to which courts
 adhere to the standard of liability in cases of negligence only. We find a
 plaintiff verdict is more likely in the case of death or severe injury, but
 this does not necessarily imply relaxation of the negligence standard.
 Out-of-court settlements are strongly influenced by the potential ver-
 dict should the case go to court. On average, cases settle for 74 percent of
 their potential verdict. This discrepancy is larger or smaller the greater
 the litigation costs of the plaintiff or defense, respectively. For technical
 reasons, we were unable to estimate directly the probability of winning in
 court for cases actually closed out of court. However, indirect estimates
 suggest that for cases paid, this probability is in the range of .6-.8,
 whereas for cases dropped, it is .4-.5. Thus, whatever standard is applied
 by the courts does feed back to the outcome at settlement.
 Costs appear to influence disposition in the predicted manner. The
 evidence overwhelmingly refutes the allegation that insurance companies
 can be forced to pay out on any case, no matter how trivial, in order to
 avoid litigation costs. Claims with small potential verdict are less likely to
 receive payment, presumably because of relatively high litigation costs.
 Although these data cannot reveal the full long-run impact of the 1975-
 76 tort reforms, they suggest that ceilings on awards, periodic payments,
 and elimination of the plaintiff's ad damnum significantly reduce awards
 and reduce the probability and size of payment in settlement out of court.
 Limits on contingent fees decrease settlement size, increase the likeli-
 hood that a case is dropped, and decrease the likelihood of litigation to
 verdict. This is interpreted as evidence that unconstrained contingent fees
 do not convey rents at the margin. If so, fee constraints will limit expendi-
 ture on litigation at the cost of reduced compensation to plaintiffs.
 The limited evidence on the determinants of the decision to go to ver-
 dict shows that the probability is higher if (1) the stakes are large (which
 suggests that fixed costs of going to court are large or that uncertainty
 increases with the severity of the injury) and (2) the plaintiff's probability
 of winning is low. The interaction between severity and stage of disposi-
 tion contributes to the observed skewness of the distribution of payout
 and to the wide gap between the mean verdict and mean settlement.
 However, the skewed distribution of dollars among claimants, although
 widely criticized, appears to be attributable primarily to the extremely
 skewed distribution of compensable damages.
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 APPENDIX
 VARIABLE DESCRIPTION AND MEANS
 Variable Full Pre-Verdict Pre-Verdict Verdict Verdict
 and Sample Drop Settle Lose Win
 Description (N = 5832) (N = 2492) (N = 2950) (N = 282) (N = 103)
 CALIFORNIA (= 1 if claim from California, 0 otherwise) .2227 .1794 .2678 .1454 .1994
 PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY (= 1 if injury was
 permanent partial disability, 0 otherwise) .2270 .1766 .2580 .3121 .3241
 PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY (= 1 if injury was
 permanent total disability, 0 otherwise) .0432 .0321 .0488 .0638 .0926
 DEATH (= 1 if injury resulted in death, 0 otherwise) .1445 .1364 .1437 .1631 .3056
 DEFENDANTS loge (In number of defendants) .3226 .2439 .3745 .3690 .5997
 INDUCED BY TREATMENT* (= 1 if injury was induced
 by treatment, 0 otherwise) .2848 .2725 .2973 .2695 .2685
 LACK PREVENTION* (= 1 if injury due to lack of
 preventive measures, 0 otherwise) .0830 .0807 .0905 .0496 .0185
 RESIPSA (= 1 if res ipsa loquitur was alleged
 [1974] or obvious treatment error [1976], 0 otherwise) .0660 .0241 .0953 .1099 .1204
 LOSS loge (In economic loss: medical, wage, and other) 5.7303 4.5780 6.4858 7.2801 7.6339
 DLOSS (<$100) (= 1 if loss <$100, 0 otherwise) .2852 .3953 .2098 .1489 .1574
 LIFE (70 - age at time of injury) 29.5711 29.2632 29.9692 28.0145 29.8634
 PPD x LIFE (PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY
 x LIFE) 6.3950 4.5744 7.6281 8.0674 10.3542
 PTD x LIFE (PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY x LIFE) 1.2734 .9927 1.3930 1.6150 3.5934
 DEATH x LIFE 4.1354 3.6999 4.2758 4.6971 8.8843
 1976 (= 1 if claim closed in 1976 [January-July],
 0 if claim closed in 1974) .5568 .5787 .5515 .4787 .3981
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 LIDt (ADt + RECLIMt + PERPDt; AD = 1 if
 law eliminates ad damnum, 0 otherwise; RECLIM = 1 if law
 limits recovery, 0 otherwise; PERPD = 1 if law permits
 periodic payments and injury is permanent, 0 otherwise) .9515 .8824 1.0268 .8227 .8241
 LID x 76 (LID x 1976) .4657 .5257 .4336 .3547 .2500
 COLLATERAL SOURCEt (= 1 if collateral source
 rule modified, 0 otherwise) .4246 .3700 .4858 .2695 .4167
 COLR x 76 (COLLATERAL SOURCE x 1976) .2462 .2548 .2502 .1418 .2130
 ATTORNEY* (= 1 if attorney represented plaintiff,
 0 otherwise) .4539 .4137 .4898 .4539 .3981
 FEE LIMITt (= 1 if law limiting contingent fee, 0 otherwise) .4078 .3680 .4610 .2270 .3426
 FEELIM x 76
 (FEELIM x 1976) .2123 .2303 .2108 .0957 .1389
 LAG IN REPORTING (In months between injury and
 filing claim) 1.9658 1.8296 2.0340 2.3862 2.1478
 COURT DELAY (In average number months of court
 delay in statet) 2.7902 2.8040 2.7727 2.8062 2.9103
 CLAIM FREQUENCY (In number claims closed in
 state in 1976) 6.6811 6.5074 6.8574 6.3598 6.7130
 PRESUIT (= 1 if claim closed prior to filing legal suit,
 0 otherwise) .4208 .6505 .2824 0 0
 PHYSICIAN (= 1 if at least 1 physician defendant,
 0 otherwise) .6835 .6681 .6837 .7695 .8056
 * Known only for 1976 claims.
 t Law passed between January 1975 and July 1976. Source: Survey of state statutes.
 $ Source: Institute for Judicial Administration, Calendar Status Study (1970, 1972, 1974).
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